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Purpose- This paper explores how localized (organization-level) actors of policy initiatives that 
are inspired by neoliberal ideologies use management accounting and control practices. 
Specifically, it addresses the operational stages of a case study Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
contract within the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) transport sector of roads for embedding government 
objectives in the underlying project road. 
 
Design/methodology/approach- This paper adopts Dean’s (2010) analytics of government to 
unpack the accounting-based control practices within the case study contract in order to articulate 
how, at the micro level, the government’s objective of improving road-users’ safety is enacted, 
modified and maintained through such regimes. 
 
Findings- Drawing on a content-based analysis of UK government PFI policy and extensive case 
study-specific documents, together with interviews and observations, this research provides 
theoretical insights about how control practices, at a distance without direct intervention, function 
as forms of power for government for shaping the performance of the PFI contractor. We find that 
the public sector’s accounting control regimes in the case study project have a constraining effect 
on ‘real partnership working’ between the government and private contractors and on the private 
sector’s incentive to innovate. 
 
Research limitations- By analyzing a single road case study PFI contract, the findings may not 
be generalizable. 
 
Originality/value- This paper provides significant theoretically-informed insights about how 
public service delivery that is outsourced to private contractors is controlled by government at a 
distance within complex organizational arrangements (e.g. PFI). 
 
Keywords: Private Finance Initiative (PFI); Public Private Partnership (PPP); Management 
Accounting; Controls; Governmentality. 
 
Article Classification: Research paper 
 
1. Introduction 
Management control systems (MCS) can be deployed by governing authorities to implement their 
strategic (policy) goals (Spence and Rinaldi, 2014; Narayan and Stittle, 2018), with accounting 
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being perceived as essential to such interventions as it offers calculation and inscription practices 
which enable governing from a distance (Walker, 2016). Arguably, MCS become even more 
crucial in network models of organizations as they are the instruments or processes for mediating 
and shaping the performance of the partnering organizations towards the strategic goals of the 
governing authority (Zahir-ul-Hassan et al., 2016).  
The United Kingdom’s (UK) enthusiasm for neoliberal policies is evidenced through the 
Conservative Government’s privatization policies in the 1980s and the subsequent adoption of 
network or mixed models for public service delivery (Jupe, 2012; Chiapello, 2017). Networks 
involving only public sector organizations (public-public) are usually state regulatory 
interventions designed to foster inter-organizational collaboration and coordination (Barretta and 
Busco, 2011). In contrast, those driven by government agendas seeking to capture private sector 
innovation and management skills for public service delivery typically involve a public-private 
arrangement (Skelcher, 2005), with the private partner being a ‘supplier’ of public services rather 
than a passive investor (Sclar, 2015). As such, public-private networks support neoliberal ideals 
by promoting private sector management styles for public service delivery (Alonso et al., 2015). 
Thus, the public procurement policy of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (popularly known in 
the UK as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI)4) is a manifestation of successive governments’ 
commitment to continued neoliberalism (Baker et al., 2009; Jupe, 2011).  
Typically, the private partner in PFI contracts is a ‘special purpose vehicle’ (SPV) which 
subcontracts the finance, design, construction, maintenance and soft services to companies that are 
often related to its shareholders (Demirag et al., 2012). Consequently, PFI contracts can be 
challenging to manage, not only due to their long-term nature, but also because operational issues 
are delegated to private contractors (Shaoul et al., 2012). Moreover, the procuring government 
department typically has to develop the project objectives a priori that need to be operationalized 
over the length of the contract through the contractual MCS (e.g. performance monitoring and 
incentives) (Ahmad et al., 2018). Hence, via the deployed MCS, PFI contracts constitute 
mechanisms of self-government5 for the contractors (Foucault, 1988). 
As successive UK governments have justified the use of PFI on the basis that the embedded 
MCS induce private sector innovation and enhance project management in delivering the specified 
services (Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), 2008), it is consistent with a neoliberal ideology which 
proposes sovereignty of the subjects (individuals) on the basis that “human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework” (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). However, while neoliberalism seeks to reduce state’s role and 
thereby grant authority to the private sector for delivering public services, this has implications for 
accounting technologies (MCS) which need to create both an enabling and regulated environment 
(Jupe and Funnell, 2015).  
In PFIs, this is particularly relevant to the incentive regime, mainly the payment mechanisms, 
which links the contractor’s financial returns to the achievement of performance targets. Moreover, 
from a PFI perspective, as the contractor has a contractual obligation to meet performance targets, 
this arguably minimizes the scope for individual agency, with self-governance supposedly being 
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established since contractors (should) have autonomy on how to achieve the performance targets. 
Thus, we consider the extent to which the deployed MCS enable (or otherwise) such freedom. 
While previous studies emphasize the crucial role of MCS in operationalizing government 
policies and providing strategic directions for departments (Frame and Bebbington, 2012; Narayan 
and Stittle, 2018), little attention has been paid to how conflicts and disagreements between public 
and private parties are resolved and good practices rewarded (English and Baxter, 2010; Chung, 
2016; Ahmad et al., 2018). Furthermore, while the first tranches of UK PFIs involved roads 
(Edwards et al., 2004), and internationally the transport sector of roads has remained the major 
recipient of PFI investment (Yehoue, 2013), management control issues within operational PFI-
road contracts have received limited consideration (Shaoul et al., 2007; Chung, 2016; Ahmad et 
al., 2018). This represents a considerable gap in our understanding of PFIs as the operations and 
maintenance phases are very different from the initial contracting and construction stages with the 
former’s greater uncertainty impacting upon public-private party relationships (Burke and 
Demirag, 2017), often due to performance measurement subjectivity because the outputs are not 
‘concretely’ measureable (English and Baxter, 2010; Chung, 2016). This paper contributes to this 
deficit by providing a better understanding of how differences, together with penalty and incentive 
schemes, unfold and thus offers insight into the chameleonic strength and durability of accounting-
based controls in supporting neoliberal initiatives such as PFI. 
Using a single case study approach (Yin, 2012), this research explores how MCS in a major 
PFI-road project under the authority of the UK’s Highways Agency (HA)6 operationalize the 
government’s strategic objectives. The case study contract (Alpha) is one of the largest PFI-road 
contracts in Europe. Applying Dean’s (2010) analytics of government, we explore how the 
objective of improving road-users’ safety is operationalized within Alpha through MCS that 
predominantly involve performance monitoring and incentive regimes. More specifically, this 
research examines the techniques and practices (i.e. MCS) deployed in Alpha as a means for 
improving safety. Accident reduction and road-users’ safety are fundamental objectives for the 
UK Department for Transport (DfT) (2000, 2004, 2015) and our purpose is not to critique these 
goals or PFI policy but rather to examine how accounting is implicated for achieving such 
objectives in complex networks using the case study Alpha. 
Given our emphasis on examining MCS within Alpha as technologies of government, the 
contract is another such technology, inviting a debate about MCS vis-à-vis contracts (Minnaar et 
al., 2017). Regimes of governing practices can be numerous and mutually influencing (Spence and 
Rinaldi, 2014), especially with PFI contracts that have multiple performative elements, together 
with MCS (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). However, since MCS, particularly performance 
monitoring and incentives, are at the heart of PFI-contract governance (HMT, 2003, 2007), these 
are the focus of analysis in Alpha. 
In terms of structure, this paper proceeds by summarizing accounting-related research on 
control and governance issues in operational PFIs, followed by an explanation of Dean’s analytics 
of government. Then, the background to Alpha and the methods applied for the empirical analysis 
are explained. Finally, the findings are discussed and conclusions drawn. 
 
2. Prior research on operational PFIs 
Accounting-related PFI research has focused on the macro (policy) perspective and pre/early 
operational decision-making (Andon, 2012), particularly with respect to how ‘risk’ and ‘value for 
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money’ (VFM) are conceptualized and operationalized (Opara and Rouse, 2018). While there is 
evidence that PFI projects have not provided VFM (Acerete et al., 2011), letting projects fail is 
not good for any party, especially in terms of maintaining public service delivery and the reputation 
of government (Burke and Demirag, 2015; Shaoul et al., 2012), with it being accepted that 
intervention must be carefully considered to ensure the appropriate use of public money and avoid 
setting a precedent. 
An important research theme that has received limited attention is the role and effect of 
accounting practices on operational contract management (Chung, 2016; Caperchione et al., 2017; 
Ahmad et al., 2018). Appendix 1 indicates only nine studies (shaded rows) have empirically 
examined controls and inter-party relationships in operational PFIs. The remaining six papers 
provide a normative discussion (based upon a literature review) on the control and management of 
PFI contracts (Broadbent et al., 2003; English et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2015) or a review of 
performance audits by independent bodies of operational PFIs (Pollock and Price, 2008). The nine 
highlighted papers utilize case study methods to explore the controls and inter-party relationships 
during the cases’ operational phases. For example, Abdullah and Khadaroo (2020) examine the 
role of control in building trust in a school context, together with how trust in turn affects control. 
Chung (2016) illustrates how inter-party collaboration becomes performative in managing the 
hand-back of an Australian PFI-road project, while Ahmad et al. (2018) address the 
implementation of MCS in a UK-based PFI project, including how these are influenced by inter-
party trust practices. Similar themes are tackled by English and Baxter (2010) in Australian prison 
PFI contracts, with Broadbent et al. (2004, 2008) and Edwards et al. (2004) exploring different 
aspects of MCS associated with managing risk and VFM during post-procurement. 
Whilst the above research enhances our understanding of governance-related challenges and 
risks during the operational stages of PFI contracts, MCS effectiveness is not addressed. Moreover, 
aspects of the findings are conflicting. In some early PFIs, the private sector had little input into 
the MCS design (Broadbent et al., 2004), whilst procuring government departments struggled to 
develop key performance indicators (KPIs) for the project, particularly for non-quantifiable 
(qualitative) outcomes, which caused dissonance among the contracting partners (Edwards et al., 
2004). In contrast, English and Baxter (2010), Chung (2016) and Ahmad et al. (2018) contend that 
difficulties in defining KPIs and other contractual clauses at the beginning of such long-term 
contracts, which might trigger performance and relational risks, can be addressed through (non-
contractual) collaboration and trust practices in operational PFI contracts. Indeed, Abdullah and 
Khadaroo (2020) suggest that control per se and trust can evolve and co-exist.  
Our paper provides a theoretically-informed examination of how the operationalized MCS in 
Alpha construct the project objectives such that the deployed control regimes strategically direct 
the contractors. This is important because, compared to other jurisdictions, as UK PFI contracts 
are typically more structured due to UK central government guidelines (Steijn et al., 2011), it is 
imperative to understand the ongoing dynamics of MCS in operational PFI contracts (Ahmad et 
al., 2018). Moreover, operationalized MCS in UK PFIs have evolved into stringent performance-
based mechanisms (Shaoul et al., 2007), with Alpha being a recent example, whereas previous 
PFI-road case studies have examined older shadow toll contracts (e.g. Edwards et al., 2004). 
Consequently, this study provides insights about MCS regimes not investigated previously and 
identifies that, despite elaborate monitoring and incentive regimes compared to predecessor PFI-




3. Governmentality and analytics of government 
Our conceptual perspective for understanding the role of MCS as forms of power (i.e. technologies 
of government) in Alpha draws from the governmentality literature (Foucault, 1991), specifically 
Dean’s (2010) analytics of government.  
Dean (2010) suggests that in neoliberal states central government does not attempt to achieve 
its objectives through direct controls, but power (governance) is exercised through a network of 
diverse elements as the role of government is reduced to enabling citizens to help themselves 
(Bujaki et al., 2017). Foucault (1991, p. 102) terms this complex network of diverse constituents 
forming government as ‘governmentality’, defining it as “[t]he ensemble formed by the 
institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise 
of this very specific albeit complex form of power”. As such, the implementation of policy 
objectives involves convergence of political discourse, knowledge and experts to present 
problematized (governable) issues and (discursively articulated) objectives as a form of truth. 
These are then pursued through an ensemble of regimes of governing technologies involving 
disciplinary and self-governing mechanisms (Rose and Miller, 1992; Nyamori, 2009). 
Consequently, accounting technologies (such as MCS) are a fundamental means for governing 
organizations (including network-models) (Eckersley et al., 2014; Spence and Rinaldi, 2014) and 
society (Mennicken, 2010; Maran et al., 2016; Walker, 2016) since, through calculative, 
inscription and recording practices, they have the capacity to mediate between the goals of the 
(localized) actors. 
Chiapello and Baker (2011) contend that governmentality provides a useful conceptual 
framework for studying neoliberal reforms that involve networking and increasing the private 
sector’s role in public service delivery as it enables researchers to identify the relationship between 
governing rationalities and their associated regimes of governing (accounting) technologies. As 
Dean’s (2010) analytics of government, which builds upon Foucault’s (1982, 1991) lectures on 
‘governmentality’ (Raffnsøe et al., 2017), conceptualizes governmentality as requiring the 
elements of problematization, utopian ideals and regimes of practices, its application facilitates 
unbundling aspects of such regimes and an understanding of how policy objectives or rationalities 
are embedded into the associated governing technologies (Frame and Bebbington, 2012). While 
Dean’s framework has been applied in accounting research on sustainability (Frame and 
Bebbington, 2012; Spence and Rinaldi, 2014), these studies acknowledge that it has the potential 
to provide new and distinctive explanations about regimes of practices by analyzing how they are 
linked to the underlying policy rationalities. Thus, this paper adds to existing governmentality-
based accounting studies by adopting Dean’s framework for analyzing a complex PFI organization 
and provides important insights about the effectiveness of MCS (in Alpha), together with the 
challenges for accounting-based governmentality when confronted by different operating logics.  
 
3.1  Analytics of government 
Commenting on government as ‘conduct of conduct’, Dean (2010) suggests that the verb means 
to guide, direct or lead, whereas the reflexive verb implies self-direction or self-regulation. 
Directing behavior towards certain ends is possible when there are standards or norms, together 
with when there are agents to ensure that the behavior complies with those standards or norms. 
This implies those agents, who are responsible for regulating (or controlling) the behavior of 
subjects, can also deliberate and intervene. Dean contends that governing practices are constitutive 
of self-governance, with intervention taking the form of programmes that shape the ‘field of action’ 
and empower the actors to choose how to act (Nyamori, 2009). 
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An analytics of government requires an examination of the agents and authorities, the forms 
of knowledge integrated with governance and the associated technologies of government. It 
addresses “how thought operates within our organized ways of doing things, our regimes of 
practices, and with its ambitions and effects” (Dean, 2010, p. 27) and is the means “by which the 
actual governing activity is achieved” (Frame and Bebbington, 2012, p. 252). As regimes can be 
institutionalized practices if they are routinized and ritualized (e.g. MCS within inter-
organizational settings) (Mouritsen and Thrane, 2006), an analytics of government places regimes 
of practices at the heart of the analysis to ascertain their intrinsic logic (Spence and Rinaldi, 2014). 
This requires an examination of four aspects or dimensions of the regimes of practices, which Dean 
proposes as axes of governmentality: fields of visibilities, knowledge, identities and techniques and 
practices (Table 1). These four axes co-exist and interact, with no one reducible to another. The 
remainder of this section discusses these four axes, which form the basis of our empirical enquiry. 
 
 
Table 1 Dimensions of the analytics of government 
 
 (a) Problematization (Identification of) social issues/problems in policy discourse that 
represent government’s recognition of the need to intervene through 
policy initiatives for rectifying the issues/problems. 
 
(b) Utopian Ideal (Identification of) the objectives in policy discourse that are sought 
through government’s intervention and which direct the regimes of 
(governing) practices. 
 
(c) Regimes of 
Practices 
The elements (axes) that form the activities, mechanisms, ways or 
technologies of government through which policy goals (which arise 
from the problematization and utopian ideals) are embedded in 
social, organizational and individual practices. Regimes of 
(governing) practices operate along four axes: 
 
 (i) Fields of 
Visibilities 
Distinguished attributes of governing created by the use of particular 
techniques and practices; 
 (ii) Knowledge Types of knowledge used and produced within the techniques and 
practices; 
 (iii) Identities Individual and collective identities that emerge from and support the 
governance processes. This includes professional or specialist 
knowledge through which programmes are made operable; and 
 (iv) Techniques 
and practices 
The means, mechanisms or technologies used by government to 
shape conduct (i.e. govern) to achieve their objectives (which may 
create visibilities, knowledge and identities). 




Fields of visibility: 
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Dean (2010, p. 41) argues that fields of visibility “…make it possible to ‘picture’ who and what is 
to be governed, how relations...are constituted…what problems are to be solved and what 
objectives are to be sought” (e.g. an architectural drawing, a management flow chart, graphs or 
tables). In applying the field of visibility analytics, we are seeking to understand the ways that 
‘increasing road-users’ safety’ are perceived and framed as operational goals within Alpha, and 
how that constitutes the SPV as a (self-governing) subject.  
 
Knowledge: 
This represents the expertise and calculative techniques that inform or arise from governing 
activities. It is characterized by ways of thinking, reflection and questioning of government that 
rely on certain vocabularies and procedures that constitute truth (Foucault, 1991). In Alpha, we 
examine the focus (agendas), structure and outcome of the reports, meetings and other means of 
inter-party communications that are prescribed or practiced for safety-related performance review 
and management. An important issue in PFI projects, including Alpha, is the tension of producing 
objective data for (subjectively assessing) road-users’ safety. 
 
Identities: 
Dean (2010) argues that government programmes create regimes of practices that engender 
individual and collective roles, attributes, orientations and positions (i.e. identities) for both those 
who govern and those who are governed, which includes assigning agency for conducting upon 
others and oneself (Frame and Bebbington, 2012). For example, government programmes might 
conceptualize service users as customers and distinguish between desirable and less desirable 
public service organizations (Nyamori, 2009). Hence, given the individual and collective identities 
that emerge from and support the governance processes (e.g. professional or specialist knowledge 
through which programmes are made operable) (Spence and Rinaldi, 2014), it is important to 
understand those which the MCS construct for the SPV vis-à-vis the project objective of improving 
commuters’ safety.  
 
Techniques and practices: 
Dean (2010) contends that if government is to achieve its goals, it must use certain technical means 
for intervention that, linked to underlying policy (or political) rationales or values, limits decision 
making. For example, for the government to manage the economy, economic models that take 
account of matters such as the balance of payments or inflation are utilized (Dean, 2010). Thus, 
techniques of governmentality may be mundane systems of inscription and notation, vocabularies, 
trainings or professional expertise through which government is achieved (Miller and Rose, 1990). 
However, the deployment of such techniques may constrain achievable outcomes, create 
unexpected problems or even cause dissonance (Spence and Rinaldi, 2014). For Alpha, we focus 
on those aspects of the MCS (e.g. (financial) incentives) which empower the HA to intervene to 
achieve the safety-related goals.  
 
 
4. The case study and research methods 
4.1  Background 
Alpha, which was signed during the late 2000s, is a 30-year contract, with the HA having executive 
responsibility for its management. Alpha is distinctive from other UK PFI-road projects because 
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of the complexity of its incentive regimes, particularly the payment mechanism, and their links to 
the performance outputs. The project’s rationale was: 
 
[Alpha] is one of the busiest motorways in Europe with some sections carrying up to 200,000 
vehicles per day...the level of congestion leads to queuing which increases the risk of 
accidents. (Alpha’s Business Case) 
 
Under the contract, the SPV was responsible for widening (construction) two motorway sections 
(approximately 40 miles), together with operations and maintenance over the contract period for 
the entire project road (approximately 242 miles, including certain bridges and tunnels). The 
operationalization of the project’s objectives, to improve road-users’ safety during the operations 
and maintenance stages, required the SPV to perform against performance measurement and 
incentives regimes informed by KPIs set by the DfT. These are discussed below.  
 
4.2  Research methods 
For governmentality-informed qualitative research, document analysis represents a primary 
component because an examination of the language and the artefacts employed in the governing 
documents enables researchers to develop a critical understanding of the underlying systems of 
thought and action (Maran et al., 2016). This study is qualitative, with data being collected and 
analyzed in several stages. Our primary source was the case-related documents, including: Alpha’s 
Business Case and Contract, obtained under a Freedom of Information Act (2000) request to the 
HA; HA online policy information about PFI-road procurement; HMT and National Audit Office 
(NAO) guidance on PFI-payment mechanisms, contract and inter-party relations management; and 
other related publicly-available reports and articles (Table 2). The principal document of analysis 
was ‘Schedule 18 Contract and Performance Management’ (Schedule 18), which is the main 
governance document for Alpha and which provides a detailed framework of the control regimes 
deployable during the project’s operations and maintenance stages. Additional (confidential) 
documents addressing the day-to-day operations of the MCS were obtained during the authors’ 
visits to the case study sites and through email correspondence with the contract representatives 
(these included safety-related performance reports produced by the SPV, charts levying the 
performance points, payments and other penalties and rewards and trends in accidents). 
Initially, we familiarized ourselves with the relevant literature and the regimes of MCS in 
Alpha in terms of their elements, deployment and consequential outcomes. Then, applying the 
analytics of government as our guiding framework and relevant literature (Silverman, 2011; Frame 
and Bebbington, 2012), we created a hierarchy of base codes to categorize the data in terms of how 
it could be seen to be contributing to the governmentality (of road-users’ safety) in Alpha. Next, 
the documents referred to above were imported and analyzed in NVivo-9.2 to identify patterns as 
to how the macro-level policy guidance (including HMT, NAO and HA guidelines) on managing 
PFI contracts is translated into the SPV’s everyday activities. The subsequent coding focused on 
the safety-related KPIs, monitoring and incentive mechanisms (including the payment-based 
incentives) and frameworks for inter-party negotiations and contract management and how those 
were shaped by the macro-level guidelines. 
To develop our understanding of the MCS in Alpha, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with senior officials at the HA and SPV in order to appreciate the lived experiences of 
the actors (Qu and Dumay, 2011). As those involved in the day-to-day management of Alpha 
would likely have insights into its operational aspects, we initially contacted Alpha’s Contract 
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Manager at the HA (who is also the Asset Delivery Manager) and the SPV’s Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) (who is the prime owner of the KPIs under the contract). Consequently, four (semi-
structured) interviews were arranged and undertaken, two at the HA and two at the SPV (with each 
lasting approximately one hour). The Contract Manager in the HA (CM-HA) and two payment 
mechanism officials with responsibility for calculating the SPV’s payments (hereafter PO-HA) 
were interviewed. In the SPV, the CEO (hereafter CEO-SPV) and finance director (hereafter FD-
SPV) were interviewed. The interviews were audio recorded with the interviewees’ permission 
and later transcribed. The interview themes were shaped by the literature review, theoretical 
insights and document analysis and focused on the effectiveness (or tensions) of the MCS, 
addressing issues such as the respondents’ perceptions of and experience with the safety-related 
KPIs and underlying monitoring and incentive regimes. To enhance the relevance of the 
interviewees’ responses, respondents were asked to illustrate their answers with practical examples 
(Marginson, 2004). Thus, the interviews not only provided opportunities for triangulating our 
findings from the document analysis, they also furthered our understanding of what we were 
seeking to investigate, that is, the enabling effects of the MCS for operationalizing Alpha’s safety 
objectives through the KPIs and their associated monitoring and incentive regimes. 
To confirm our understanding of the document analysis and interviews, the interviewees were 
provided with a summary of our analysis for comment. This facilitated two follow-up telephone 
interviews, each lasting approximately 45-minutes. Additionally, one of the co-authors visited the 
case road on a number of occasions to observe how safety-related performance issues were 
operationalized, including the private sector’s intervention regarding safety improvement 
measures on the project road, and corresponded with the themes emerging from the analysis. 
However, as will be explained in the next section, besides the use of safety signs and 
implementation of speed limits, no other distinctive initiatives by the contractors were observed. 
Since we engaged with senior people involved in the day-to-day management of Alpha who gave 
freely of their time for interview, shared confidential documents and allowed on-site access to the 
case road, further interviews were deemed unnecessary in order to avoid data overload (Marginson, 
2004; Qu and Dumay, 2011; Spence and Rinaldi, 2014; Bartocci et al., 2019). Moreover, the 
various methods employed gave the authors comfort that a saturation of themes had been reached 
(NCRM, 2012; Power and Gendron, 2015). 
By applying the theoretical lens of the analytics of government, the findings were framed from 
a governmentality perspective and written-up, and subsequently refined through iterative meetings 
and discussions with other research colleagues (Zahir-ul-Hassan et al., 2016). These sequential 
stages permitted the authors to better understand the regimes of MCS deployed in Alpha and 
categorize the contents of Schedule 18 (and hence the associated coded data from other sources) 
from the perspective of the four axes of analytics of government (fields of visibility, knowledge, 






















Table 2 Key documents analyzed 
 
Alpha# HMT# NAO#* 
(i) Business Case 
(ii) Operations and 
Maintenance Contract 
including Schedule 18 
(iii) Parliamentary, NAO and 
newspaper reports on 
Alpha 
(iv) SPV’s Annual reports, 
performance reports and 
on-line project updates 
(v) HA’s on-line policy 
narrative on PFI 
procurements  
(vi) Project control and 
governance documents 
obtained from interview 
respondents during field 
visits and through 
follow-up emails 
(i) PFI: Strengthening 
Long-term Partnerships 
(2006) 
(ii) VFM Assessment 
Guidance (2006) 
(iii) Operational Taskforce 
Note 2 – Project 
Transition Guidance 
(2007) 
(iv) Standardization of PFI 
Contracts – Version 4 
(2007) 








(vii) Contract Expiry 
Guidelines, Operational 
Taskforce Note 4 




(i) Managing Relationships 
to secure a successful 
Partnership in PFI 
projects (2001) 
(ii) A Framework for 
Evaluating the 
Implementation of 
Private Finance Initiative 
Project, Vol. I and II 
(2006) 
(iii) From Private Finance 




utilizing private finance - 
A current best practice 
model for Departments 
(2010) 
* All NAO reports on UK-road PFIs were also analyzed. 
# The documentary data highlighted in this table comprised approximately 1,500 pages. 
 
 
Having outlined the background to Alpha and the research methods employed, the next section 





5. An analytics of government in Alpha 
A key rationale for adopting PFI is concerns over conventional public sector infrastructure 
procurement to deliver appropriate governance, control structures and hence VFM (Sclar, 2015). 
From a policy (rhetoric) perspective, successive UK governments have supported PFI, claiming 
its contractual controls can induce whole-life planning and execution of project services, thus 
enhancing VFM for government and services users (HMT, 2007, 2008, 2012). This section places 
these claims in the context of Alpha and explores the (hidden) rationality and mechanisms in place 
to govern the project road, specifically with respect its objective of improving road-users’ safety.  
 
5.1 Fields of visibility 
By applying the ‘visibility’ analytic, we seek to understand how the UK government’s aim of 
improving road-users’ safety is perceived and constructed in Alpha. Our findings reveal that road-
users’ safety is given legitimacy and visibility at different strategic levels of (policy and decision-
making) discourse and operations. At the macro-level, it is at the forefront of several transport 
policy documents that shape the broader political modernization objective (Jupe, 2011). From 
early 2000s, the DfT emphasized road network investment, modernization and expansion as 
primary capital investment objectives, with PFI being a major contributor to this (DfT, 2004). For 
example, DfT (2000) allocated £21 billion to the strategic highways network (which includes 
Alpha)7, of which 25% was allocated to PFI. Alpha’s justification was driven by increasing 
demand for the underlying motorway, with severe congestion and causal accidents being 
problematized as justification for the contract:  
 
…it was a comprehensive spending review in early 2000s…which identified a package of 
capital works on the Strategic Road Network. This indicated that 25% of that works was to be 
funded through private finance. There was a kind of overarching strategy to drive an element 
of private sector investment in that programme and [Alpha] was part of that. (CM-HA) 
 
The DfT also uses Public Service Agreements as performance targets for the allocation of 
public expenditure (Micheli and Neely, 2010), with road-users’ safety forming an important 
element of these: 
 
The devastating impact of serious and fatal accidents mean that network safety remains the 
number one consideration of road users and a priority for those tasked with developing and 
managing the Strategic Road Network. (DfT, 2015, p. 59) 
 
Road-users’ safety has economic visibility, with government estimating that the cost associated 
with collisions on UK roads is £15 billion annually and intending to spend approximately £105 
million on (additional) measures to boost safety, such as speed restrictions and new tunnel safety 
systems (DfT, 2015). 
                                                          
7 The HA (now Highways England) is responsible (as an agency of the DfT) for the construction and maintenance of 
England’s Strategic Road Network. This Network, which comprises 1,865 miles of Motorways and 2,571 miles of 
Trunk-A roads, carries 33% of all traffic and 66% of all freight (DfT, 2015), making it the ‘economic backbone’ of 
the country (HA, 2012). 
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The SPV’s corporate strategy focuses on commuter safety, together with that of contractors’ 
staff and road workers. Safety is also represented visually on the SPV’s and operations and 
maintenance sub-contractors’ websites, with the slogan “Putting safety first” linked in bright red 
to safety-related performance statistics and publications. As per Schedule 18, ‘safe roads’ is 
Alpha’s primary aim (followed by ‘reliable journeys’ and ‘informed travelers’), with objectives 
supporting these aims being translated into four groups that are governed by performance measures 
and implementation plans. Safety, which is captured under the first group of project objectives, 
has two performance areas: firstly, to maintain the project road in a safe and serviceable condition; 
and secondly, response management to accidents, incidents and winter services. We focus on the 
first performance area as this involves life-cycle management and initiatives for road-users’ safety 
(Figure A). Since achieving road-users’ safety is made visible in Schedule 18 as a lever for 
achieving some of the other major corporate goals of the HA (i.e. sustainability and VFM), safety 
attains added legitimacy and priority. 
Dean (2010) notes that the use of diagrams of power and authority can illuminate the 
operations of a particular regime. Figure A indicates that the most critical performance issues relate 
to mitigating accidents, particularly KSIs (Killed or seriously injured ), with the SPV’s operations 
and maintenance sub-contractors being required to develop and implement safety-related schemes 
and action plans (Safety Action Plans). While it might be expected that accident risk mitigation 
would focus on decreasing the overall number of collisions (including minor casualties), Alpha’s 
payment mechanism (see Section 5.4) includes an exclusive financial (safety-related) incentive 
relating to reducing KSIs. If the risk mitigation measures are operationalized as strategically-
funded schemes for improving road-users’ safety, these become Safety Improvement Schemes 
(Figure A): 
 
The Safety Improvement Schemes come out of the Safety Action Plans. If I drew a hierarchy, 
essentially you have the Route Safety Plan, which becomes a Safety Action Plan and then a 
Safety Improvement Scheme. Once an action plan is done, you get your funding, then it 
































Figure A KPIs for road-users’ safety in Alpha 
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the government’s stated primary objective. Also, while Alpha enables the private sector to fund 
safety-related schemes, with possible rebates from the HA, the underlying payment mechanisms 
offered little incentive for the SPV to do this. This was acknowledged by private sector and HA 
interviewees: 
 
There could be an argument that the idea is to incentivize the DBFO-Co8 to undertake their 
own schemes which they could implement by funding themselves…{T}he contract allows them 
to do this at their own cost if they believe it will provide them with a long-term benefit. I can’t 
actually see them doing safety schemes because I don’t think the incentive is so great. (PO-
HA) 
 
These fields of visibility indicate how government objectives of road-users’ safety are framed 
and translated as project objectives in Alpha, with the HA (i.e. government) principally defining 
the contractors’ performance measures since the KPIs in Figure A are derived from the HA’s 
corporate aims. Moreover, the most critical performance area for the HA was reducing KSIs on 
the project road, with minor causalities receiving less attention. Thus, while government promotes 
road-users’ safety as the primary strategic aim for the UK’s Strategic Road Network and for Alpha 
particularly, it appears to be tempered with respect to implementing safety schemes. This raises 
concerns about UK government outsourcing policies for public services, specifically PFIs, as these 
could have limited capacities for transferring (and mitigating) operational risks and hence for 
delivering VFM (Jupe, 2012). It also raises doubts about the effectiveness of performance 
measures relating to public service delivery given there are gaps (loose coupling) between their 
underlying aspirations and actual implementation, as illustrated by the HA’s restrained motivation 
and SPV’s limited incentivization to fund Safety Improvement Schemes.  
We now turn to the remaining three axes of governmentality to further illustrate the regimes 
of governance and control in Alpha for embedding the government’s objective of improving road-
users’ safety.  
 
5.2 Knowledge 
Governing practices have a cognitive element that inform the rationalities, together with the 
technologies of government (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1991). “[T]he way we think about exercising 
authority draws upon the expertise, vocabulary, theories, ideas, philosophies and other forms of 
knowledge that are given and available to us….[T]hese mentalities are often derived from the 
human sciences (such as psychology, economics, management [accounting] or medicine)” (Dean, 
2010, p. 25). Thus, expertise and specialism (e.g. accounting) augments the knowledge that forms 
part of governing. As an axis of governmentality, the knowledge analytic allows us to focus on the 
language of discourse, norms and values entailed in the governing practices through which the 
conduct of the actors (subjects) is (re)organized (Dean, 2010). In applying this dimension to Alpha, 
we concentrate on the road-users’ safety-related performance review practices during the 
contract’s operations and maintenance stages. Performance review in Alpha relied primarily on 
complex information technology-based (IT) information flows.  
Self-reporting by the SPV regarding achievements or performance lags is a key feature in 
Alpha, with performance reports being produced monthly, quarterly and annually. Schedule 18 
establishes monthly reports as the primary performance assessment mechanism, with actual 
                                                          
8 DBFO (Design, Build, Finance and Operate) is a UK term for PFI. Some interviewees used the term ‘DBFO-Co’ 
when referring to the SPV. 
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activity being color coded against 250-300 targets. The SPV and sub-contractors produce 
performance dashboards containing graphical and bulleted information showing performance 
against KPIs on a month-by-month rolling basis, together with three-month projections. For 
example, relating to safety, the dashboards report numbers and trends in KSIs. Moreover, the SPV 
must maintain a register of Remedial Action Plans, with progress on remedial actions and the 
addition of new plans being important agenda items at the monthly management meetings.  
Information flows are an essential MCS component, particularly in inter-organizational 
settings (Tomkins, 2001). In Alpha, the performance management plans are linked with 
information management plans and the SPV is required to maintain sophisticated IT-based 
information flows that can produce usable performance information: 
 
What we really want from them is that they gather the right intelligence, they come up with 
the right interventions, which deliver good value for money. (CM-HA) 
 
The primary KPIs for road-users’ safety relate to the number and trend of KSI accidents on the 
project road (Figure A), with the Safety Performance Adjustment (SPA) (payment mechanism) 
(Figure D) feeding into this indicator as it involves comparison with other (comparator) roads. 
Under the contract, the SPV maintains a live interface (‘Knowledge Management Center’) as the 
focal point of information management across the project, with activities including the monitoring 
of (safety-related) performance information and live feeds (e.g. from cameras). Hence, the 
Knowledge Management Center’s role is to collect and communicate information to appropriate 
contractor and HA personnel:  
 
We have real-life reporting and real-life dashboards that go with this. We have a live 
dashboard to show how that is being done and which ones are being addressed. This is how 
performance is managed. (CEO-SPV)  
 
Moreover, under Alpha’s information management plan, the SPV maintains an integrated IT 
interface (‘One Place System’) which provides visibility and control of processes and procedures 
to relevant parties, including the identification of activities affecting specific KPIs. The 
Knowledge Management Center is an integral component of the One Place System, with these 
systems facilitating informed decision making. As provision of public benefits is a primary 
objective of PFIs (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011), one would expect that the commuting 
public to also have access to key performance information within the One Place System (Shaoul 
et al., 2012; Florio, 2014). In this regard, the contract requires the SPV to ensure efficient 
transmission of incidents and weather-related traffic disruption data from the Knowledge 
Management Center to HA’s traffic management systems called Regional Control Centers. 
Moreover, information from customer surveys conducted at the call centers may be transmitted to 
the Knowledge Management Center.  
The HA is allowed continuous access to the Open Place System and Knowledge Management 
Center, illustrating its self-identification as an agent for road users. Consequently, while the 
Knowledge Management Center and One Place System offer self-governance opportunities for the 
SPV and sub-contractors by allowing them to review the impact of their (remedial) interventions, 
as the HA can monitor information hubs which are internal to the contractors’ decision-making 
these may serve as panoptical mechanisms for the HA. Thus, the freedom for the SPV (and 
subcontractors) to self-govern could be undermined (Eckersley et al., 2014).  
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The idea of a panopticon (a metaphor embraced by Foucault (1977) for discipline and control) 
is that if people believe they might be under surveillance, they would discipline themselves by 
conforming to desired norms (Eckersley et al., 2014). Within Alpha, accounting (numbers) is 
integrally entwined in these information systems through the language for inputs and outputs (e.g. 
trend in accidents). Accordingly, accounting enables the HA to govern the SPV’s (safety) 
performance, by instituting standards, rules and guidelines that establish norms (in the form of 
KPIs) and secure compliance (Walker, 2016). However, this implies that despite PFI being a 
network (partnership) form of organization where one would expect relational and flexible 
contracting to enable contractor innovation and inter-party negotiations (English and Baxter, 
2010), Alpha’s knowledge analytic reveals a non-democratic, hierarchical (panoptical) approach.  
The monthly management meetings also focus on areas where performance targets are not 
achieved, with little opportunity for discussing private sector innovation, despite this being 
espoused as a PFI benefit (Rangel and Galande, 2010). For example, the agenda for these meetings 
includes: 
 areas where performance targets have not been achieved; 
 areas where either party believes performance targets are unlikely to be achieved; 
 areas identified in the monthly report where performance is falling below the Agreement’s 
required standards; and 
 the Performance (penalty) Point Events register (see Section 5.4). 
Overall, monthly management meeting agenda comprises nine items, of which eight ‘question’ 
performance and only one addresses (safety) proposals. This performance measurement approach 
is amplified across Alpha’s MCS regime. For instance, an analysis of the Performance Point Event 
register reveals that there are only provisions for issuing points to the SPV for not meeting certain 
performance criteria, not for rewarding acceptable performance. Moreover, the monthly 
management meetings tend to be bureaucratic rather than designed to facilitate constructive 
feedback flows: 
 
Do they believe that they are getting the best service? I feel that the answer is ‘no’. But maybe 
they are pre-conditioned to say no. Do we believe that we are trying to give them the best? 
Yeah! Do we believe we are trying to give them value? Yeah! Do we believe we are on the 
right side of doing the best we can to make sure this works? Yes! On that basis, it is very 
difficult to bridge the two. (CEO-SPV) 
 
Relatedly, the CM-HA commented: 
 
If you look at the agenda of the monthly management meeting, the way it is described in the 
contract is about how are we going to beat them with a stick for the things that they are doing 
wrong. There is nothing positive in it. (CM-HA) 
 
The HA uses a scorecard (‘Proactive Management Review’ (PMR)) (Figure D) for measuring 
the SPV’s performance annually. The PMR performance areas do not address safety-related issues 
specifically (e.g. KSIs). Instead, they are divided into four performance-based attributes, with each 
measured according to certain indicators. The four attributes are the contractor’s competence in: 
(i) understanding the project needs; (ii) understanding the HA’s needs; (iii) pro-activeness in 
proposing solutions; and (iv) demonstrating added value. However, we found disagreement about 




Off the record, they haven’t received PMR bonus as yet. Payment against PMR starts at score 
[y]. At the moment they have been scoring less than [y]. (PM-HA) 
 
Contractor discontent was clearly evident: 
 
The score this year was [x] out of [y], that’s like 4 out of 10. So is the contract which you are 
seeing on the ground is a 4 out of 10 contract? Clearly it is not. (CEO-SPV) 
 
The inadequacy of the PMR financial incentives was also raised: 
 
I think the Proactive Management Review could be better incentivized. If there was an 
incentivization for say £10 million then it might be worth pushing innovation and pushing 
excellence. Then they would genuinely get some value out of it. (CEO-SPV) 
 
These issues highlight the challenges and contradictions about how performance for qualitative 
areas (e.g. impact of safety schemes) is measured and used for allocating incentives. This illustrates 
a limitation of accounting as numbers used or produced by (accounting) control regimes may not 
be trusted as scientific; rather these could be (at times) judgmental and subjective (Broadbent et 
al., 2008; Spence and Rinaldi, 2014).  
Besides the regular performance reporting practices discussed above, the HA audit safety-
related interventions by contractors (Figure A) again depict its self-identification as agents of road 
users and therefore could dominate and influence SPV designs and interventions. However, given 
the SPV must satisfy the HA as the client in order to safeguard its commercial interests, it takes 
safety audits seriously: 
 
Although there are no financial incentives attached for doing safety audits, there is 
reputational incentive…. We want to be known as the safest network for the Agency. (CEO-
SPV) 
 
The perspectives presented under the knowledge dimension of governmentality in Alpha 
demonstrate that IT, together with generated information flows, is fundamental for MCS in 
complex inter-organizational settings. However, from a governmentality perspective, (accounting-
based) knowledge applied for control and governance might not always be perceived as precise, 
particularly given the separate operating logics of network members (Pettersen, 2015). 
Organizational operating logics may be understood as the ‘rules of games’ for meeting objectives 
and solving problems (Billis, 2010) or over-arching principles for interpreting organizational 
reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior and how to succeed (Bartocci et al., 2019).  
Particularly for PFI organizations, whilst important, developing mutual understanding about 
the interests (logics) of the actors coming together as partners is challenging (Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff, 2011). In PFIs, as observed from the contentions under Alpha’s knowledge analytic, 
the procuring authority’s operating logics which are dominated by public values (Koppenjan et al., 
2008) interact with (and dominate) the private sector’s commercial logics. Multiple operating 
logics in PFIs could also exert competing accountability pressures, particularly for the private 
sector (Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019). While the procuring authority is ultimately accountable to 
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the public, the contractors are accountable to the client (government) as well as their shareholders 
and financiers (Demirag et al., 2012): 
 
I think we always have had good relations with the banks. At one point, we went over 2000 
performance points and we had to write a report…. (CEO-SPV) 
 
Therefore, PFI involves multiple operating logics that could challenge the reliance and usefulness 
of accounting controls for producing performance measures that are deemed legitimate and useful 
for feedback by the partners. This is consistent with previous PFI literature that contends that the 
contracting partners could have different notions about what constitutes VFM (Demirag and 
Khadaroo, 2008), as we find in Alpha:  
 
When you said there are too many [performance measures], there may well be. But as I said 
to the Treasury, if that is the measure of a good performing contract then what you are paying 
for, you are getting. What it [MCS] doesn’t do is to say what extra we are to do, which then 
would come into this definition of value for money, which in my personal opinion is not 
possible to get a rational view about. (CEO-SPV) 
 
We now consider the formation of the identities and techniques and practices analytics in Alpha. 
 
5.3 Identities 
Accounting (i.e., MCS) can be instrumental in identity formation as through the processes of 
measurement, reporting and making (subjects) visible, it impacts on subjects and the relationships 
they have with themselves and the governing authorities (Walker, 2016; Bujaki et al., 2017). 
Understanding the identity created for the SPV is important given PFI policy discourse contends 
that the private sector can bring improved services, innovation and hence VFM (Shaoul et al., 
2007; Rangel and Gelande, 2010). Thus, through the identities analytic, we are seeking to explore 
the SPV’s roles in terms of its standing with respect to the capacities (agencies) assigned to it and 
how it is ranked or prioritized with respect to the client (HA), users and other stakeholders, together 
with how the MCS influence the SPV’s conduct, capacities and aspirations with respect to it 
achieving the project’s road-users’ safety objectives.  
In the preceding knowledge analytic, we demonstrated that a primary function of Alpha’s 
MCS is to safeguard and manage the underlying public services. Thus, as would be expected, the 
commuting public are recognized as SPV’s primary stakeholder: 
 
…delivery of high quality…service that puts customers first. (Schedule 18) 
 
However, despite the SPV being charged with this, authority for defining the project’s objectives 
and reviewing performance lies with the Secretary of State for Transport through the HA. 
Moreover, whilst the contract requires the SPV to engage with stakeholders, including commuters, 
for learning and sharing best practices, the SPV is enforced rather than encouraged or incentivized 
to undertake such consultations as these are measured as performance indicators (Figure D) (with 





The DBFO-Co will listen to what they tell the DBFO-Co, then change and improve the DBFO-
Co’s approach accordingly. (Schedule 18) 
 
Besides survey-based feedback (see Section 5.2), the SPV can consult with the public via 
thematic conferences: 
 
I have a conference each year and the theme of last year’s was ‘service excellence within a 
changing organization and a changing environment’. What we have to do is to prove, whether 
it be safety, congestion, investment, asset-management or other issues, that we are number 
one in terms of performance within the Agency. (CEO-SPV) 
 
Although, the SPV believed such activities had little effect on achieving optimal safety outcomes 
as it did not have authority to operate or manage traffic: 
 
Our job is to manage the network from the road-users’ perspective but we don’t have much 
authority because we are not the operators of the network, the Highways Agency is. The most 
important thing is we try to educate them [public] as much as possible about what we do and 
how we do it. And a lot of this has to do with the government and the Highways Agency…. 
(CEO-SPV) 
 
HA interviewees also acknowledged that the SPV (alone) had limited influence on road-users’ 
safety: 
 
In case of safety…what the DBFO-Co controls is the engineering of the network. It doesn’t 
control drivers’ behavior, it doesn’t control enforcement, it doesn’t control the education of 
the road users. (CM-HA) 
 
This is compounded by the SPV’s contention the HA could veto (and hence restrain) SPV safety 
proposals:  
 
We wanted to put a VMS sign [variable message sign] to tell the travelling public that there 
was a commissioning going on at the [xyz] tunnel. And the Agency said, you are not putting 
those up because they are not approved. I believe it would have helped people drive better 
through the works but we weren’t allowed to do it. (CEO-SPV) 
 
Previous studies about UK PFI-road projects report similar difficulties for contractors in 
introducing change during operations and maintenance stages as the HA typically adheres to 
approved designs and operational codes, with approving change being time consuming as 
proposals must pass several levels of screening (Edwards et al., 2004). Moreover, our HA 
respondents emphasized that consideration of the safety implications of SPV would be paramount: 
 
…if you put some road signs or markings, then someone will go along and drive through it, 
walk through it, look at it… and see if that scheme introduces any safety issues. So you can 




Such conflicting views on what constitutes a ‘safety-measure’ intervention substantiate the 
arguments developed in the preceding knowledge analytic that different operating logics within 
network forms of organizations can make defining processes and outcomes difficult, leading to 
increased tensions and reduced MCS effectiveness of the MCS (Pettersen, 2015). 
Although the SPV is charged with achieving the project’s safety objectives and the travelling 
public is its primary stakeholder, our findings reveal that the government represented by the HA 
is the most important stakeholder as the control and accountability of the SPV is directed to the 
HA rather than the travelling public. Figure B depicts the self-identification of the HA as an agent 




Figure B Self-identification of the HA as the public’s agent 
 
 
    
Note: This partial reproduction of the Performance Management Framework from Schedule 18 
depicts that the HA is self-identified in the contract as an agent of the (commuting) public.   
 
Such contractual arrangements are a characteristic of UK PFIs (Steijn et al., 2011), with Figure C 
illustrating Alpha’s strong contract-based governmentality and the HA’s (i.e. government’s) 
authority to influence the SPV’s activities relating to safety and other project objectives. This 
hierarchy is enforced through contract clauses requiring the SPV to take ownership of performance 
by employing individual and team-level performance measures and incentives. Indeed, such 
cascading of HA’s corporate goals down to the SPV is described in the contract as the foremost 
‘critical success factor’, with the definition of ‘success’ providing a (de facto) authority to 
government: 
 
The DBFO-Co will develop and deliver a high-quality service to meet and exceed the 































In addition to design and construction, innovation in maintenance methods is one of the desirable 
outcomes in Alpha’s Business Case. However, given the HA’s propensity to adhere strictly to 
contractual controls, this potentially diminishes the espoused benefits of private sector innovation: 
 
  
Source: Adapted from the Performance Management Framework in Schedule 18 
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It is holding the DBFO-Co to account for what they are required to do under the contract. 
The core thing is that the base contractual requirements of managing the network and 
maintenance have to be met. (PO-HA)  
 
Furthermore, the HA’s power to shape the SPV’s performance and innovation through 
performance monitoring contradicts the neoliberal ethos of the state’s diminished role in public 
service delivery (Maran et al., 2016). 
The identities created in Alpha indicate that the SPV’s roles are sometimes mutually 
conflicting and constraining. Despite the SPV being charged with achieving the project’s road-
users’ safety objectives, authority for defining these and reviewing performance lies with the 
Secretary of State for Transport through the HA, thus subjugating the SPV to the HA and the 
Secretary of State. Also, consistent with the knowledge analytic, the identities analytic reveals that 
Alpha constrains (rather than facilitates) opportunities for drawing on private sector innovation. 
This could limit the contract’s potential if the HA and the SPV do not work as partnering 
organizations to manage risks and improve road-users’ safety (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). 
However, whilst acknowledging the potential negative consequences for VFM, a more flexible 
approach to contract management might facilitate trust building and engender a quid pro quo 
relationship (English and Baxter, 2010; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Burke and Demirag, 
2017). 
 
5.4 Techniques and practices 
Intervention is an important part of governance and, without the technical means of intervention, 
intended outcomes will not be achieved (Rose and Miller, 1992; Spence and Rinaldi, 2014). We 
apply the techniques and practices analytic to better understand how the accounting-based 
incentive regimes deployed in Alpha shape the SPV’s performance, particularly for delivering 
safety-related project objectives (Figure A). Additionally, deployment of (accounting-based) 
technical means of governance could limit what can be achieved and cause dissonance among 
partnering organizations (Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014; Ahmad et al., 2018). Therefore, we also 
consider the unintended consequences of the incentive regimes operationalized in Alpha for road-
users’ safety. 
The incentive regimes deployed in Alpha for controlling the SPV’s performance are financial 
and non-financial (Figure D). The four non-financial incentives (Figure D) are activated when 
there are performance failures by the SPV. We found that the HA widely uses performance points, 
with their accumulation leading to increased compliance costs for the SPV (at 500 points) or a loss 
of bonuses (at 600 points). Moreover, if under-performance or an unrectified breach during the 
operations and maintenance stage leads to the accumulation of more than 3,500 points, this could 
result in contract termination. However, termination must be considered in light of the availability 
of alternative delivery mechanisms (NAO, 2006). As the HA has issued performance points since 
contract inception, the SPV is mindful of this. In terms of the effectiveness of performance points 
contributing to the achievement of the contract’s objectives, the regime is believed to incentivize 
day-to-day operational targets rather long-run outcomes. Both parties acknowledged that 
performance points influence contractor operational priorities: 
 
If there has been a breach but we have some mitigation against it then the points that are 
attributed to that breach come down. But when there is no mitigation then we get the full 
points. If we didn’t have a Safety Action Plan then it would come with a whole lot of 
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performance points. Your incentivization is actually to keep all of your points down. (CEO-
SPV) 
 
The HA concurred: 
 
I think when you look at the performance regime it is about breach of obligation. What you 
find is that there are certain obligations which are defined at quite a high level, at an outcome 
level and it is quite difficult for them to breach those. And there are certain obligations which 
are defined at quite a detailed input level, and it is quite easy for them to accumulate 
performance points against those. I think there is a question about whether the performance 
regime tends to be more effective in dealing with operational and day-to-day things than 
dealing with long-term strategic issues. But having said all that, it does incentivize them, it 
puts these issues on their radar. (CM-HA) 
 
Thus, the performance points regime acts as a technology of government for achieving, or at least 
prioritizing, day-to-day operational tasks. However, as revealed under the knowledge analytic, the 
contract triggers for issuing performance points discourage private sector innovation, which is 
often cited as justification for PFI, as points are issued for breaches with there being no potential 
for rewards or bonuses.  
As a further controlling accounting technology, Alpha deploys financial incentives. Figure D 
indicates six performance-based payment mechanisms, with only the SPA (shaded row in the 
payment mechanism table in Figure D) closely representing the KPIs depicted in Figure A. 
Therefore, this is our focus of analysis. Of the other five mechanisms, three (lane availability, route 
performance and unplanned event management) address the project objective of reducing 
congestion, one relates to asset maintenance (road condition) and the PMR bonus is associated 
with the annual PMR scorecard (knowledge analytic). From our document analysis, it is evident 
that Alpha’s performance-based payment mechanisms are more extensive than contemporary PFI-
road projects, particularly in the UK. This was confirmed by our interviewees: 
 
In payment mechanism terms Alpha has got real financial teeth. There are payment 
mechanism adjustments that can be way up to £5-6 million a year. (FD-SPV)  
 
Furthermore, as mentioned previously (see Sections 1 and 2), Alpha’s MCS regimes are more 
elaborate than preceding PFI-road contracts with there being greater focus on the MCS measuring 
performance rather than prescribing outputs: 
 
[T]he performance requirements in this contract were much harder. So those people were 
actually in a mind-set of being told what to do while in this contract they had to self-manage 
themselves through a quality management system…. On [Alpha] what you have got is a much 
more complex [MCS] mechanism that seeks to align the interest the DBFO-Co against all the 
Agency’s objectives. (CM-HA) 
 
We accept that performance related to lane availability, road condition, route performance and 
unplanned event management (Figure D) also (indirectly) affect road-users’ safety objectives, 
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together with other HA priorities9. However, these areas are measured by KPIs indirectly related 
to safety, addressing asset management-related measures such as: managing roadworks, 
monitoring journey times and delays, road-surface maintenance (e.g. winter arrangements) and 
response to defects (e.g. lighting and pollutant levels). Whilst acknowledging that the performance 
elements of the payment mechanisms align with the HA’s corporate objectives, since this paper 
explores how accounting becomes implicated in complex neoliberal organizations as regimes of 
governing practices (see Section 1), we now consider road-users’ safety-related KPIs and the 
underlying control regimes (i.e. SPA and PMR) further.  
Sargiacomo (2008, p. 687) argues that disciplinary mechanisms for shaping the conduct of 
subjects should comprise punishment and gratification as they can be deployed to “align, allure 
and even seduce” the conduct of the subjects. Alpha’s financial incentives have features of 
punishment (i.e. payment deductions) and rewards (i.e. bonuses). The SPA (Figure D), which can 
be an annual deduction or a bonus, is capped at £1 million a year10. 
                                                          
9 At the time of writing, the route performance payment incentive was not operationalised due to technical difficulties 
related to acquiring the underlying data. 
10 This amount was revealed by the interviewees by way of generosity, reflecting the rapport developed while 
undertaking the research (see Section 4.2); however, none of the interviewees was able to explain the basis for this 
amount. A financial analysis of the payment mechanisms was not possible as most of the financial information in the 
case documents was redacted for commercial reasons. 
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Figure D Accounting-based incentive regimes in Alpha 
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With respect to the objective of improving road-users’ safety by reducing the number of 
serious accidents, the SPA was the only (financial) incentive operationalized through Alpha’s 
payment mechanisms. This adjustment is not specifically linked to the safety-related KPIs shown 
in Figure A, being associated with the overall outcome (i.e. decrease in KSIs) and measured against 
KSI trends on comparable motorways and Trunk-A roads. We found that since the commencement 
of operations and maintenance services, while the number of KSIs on Alpha has declined, the SPA 
has remained a deduction, effectively but unintendedly penalizing the SPV: 
 
The SPA has been negative each year but this does not imply that the DBFO-Co has been 
underperforming against the safety standards. The reason why the adjustments have been 
negative is because it is measured against comparator roads. So, if the DBFO-Co in a year 
achieves a reduction [in KSIs] but the reduction was greater on the comparator road, then 
that may not necessarily mean that they generate a bonus. (PO-HA) 
 
The underlying SPA formula compares the relative decline in KSI accidents on Alpha with 
comparator roads. This has resulted in persistent reductions (penalties) for the SPV as the 
percentage decline in Alpha’s KSIs is lower than on comparator roads; although the SPV has 
questioned the validity of the comparative data, expressing dissatisfaction with the SPA 
calculation: 
 
…[W]e have a formula that was based upon 20[X1] – 20[X5] data. In doing that and the way 
it is structured automatically gave us a loss. So we have a cap of £1.0 million and that cap was 
a cut in year 1, 2, 3, and 4, because in our view the formula was wrong. So there was no 
incentivization.…This shouldn’t have been base-lined for 20X1-20X5, it should have been 
base-lined for 20[Y1] - 20[Y5] which is when we started. (CEO-SPV) 
 
The HA acknowledged that there were technical issues related to the SPA’s design and 
operationalization: 
 
Did we really want deductions in the first few years on safety mechanism or no we didn’t? We 
didn’t test the mechanism enough to get it right in the first few years. (CM-HA)  
 
At the time of this research, the HA and SPV were considering reviewing the SPA to make it more 
acceptable to all parties whilst enabling it to be an effective incentive-based governing technology. 
The HA accepted that Alpha’s accounting regimes were supposed to incentivize the contractors to 
perform better: 
 
I mean managing [Alpha] is a big job and the reason why we are looking at strategic change 
to the pay-mech is to give them incentives and bonus to go and do better things about safety 
and all other things. (PO-HA)  
 
However, making contractual changes is cumbersome and time consuming, involving engagement 
with major stakeholders including the financiers: 
 
Any review of SAP [Safety Action Plans], I suspect that the banks are going to be involved 
because it is going to affect the payment that goes to the DBFO-Co. For any change they have 
27 
to have lenders’ consent.… [I]f the change is going to have a significant effect on payments 
then banks might even send their financial people. (PO-HA) 
 
Relatedly, a SPV respondent not only concurred but was critical about the inflexibility of UK PFIs: 
 
And I have seen this not just on this project but on hospital projects as well where the consent 
process is nothing else but very time-consuming and is normally quite expensive because its 
time consuming. And its lawyers and accountants and senior commercial officers whose time 
is being spent and there is very little to show at the end of it…. (FD-SPV) 
 
The perceived difficulties in changing (tight) contractual terms have two implications for this 
paper. Firstly, and related to the identities analytic discussion, whilst the SPV is responsible for 
achieving the project’s road-users’ safety objectives and the commuting public is its primary 
stakeholder, the contract exerts multiple accountability logics on the SPV such that it has to respond 
to the client’s (HA) performance requirements and be cognizant of the financiers’ commercial 
interests (Demirag et al., 2012; Shaoul et al., 2012). Secondly, as PFI contracts have now operated 
for a reasonable period, there is a growing recognition that project outcomes may be enhanced by 
developing collaborative approaches to governance rather than tight (arms-length) arrangements, 
especially given the long-term and uncertain nature of PFI contracts (Chung, 2016; Ahmad et al., 
2018). 
When interviewees were asked about the SPA’s effectiveness as a driver for delivering safety-
related action plans and improvement schemes (Figure A), it was recognized that safety is a long-
term objective requiring strategic as well as capital-intensive planning and initiatives. As discussed 
under fields of visibility (see Section 5.1), the HA or SPV may fund safety improvements schemes. 
However, as a SPV-proposed safety scheme must meet the same assessment criteria deployed by 
the HA for evaluating business proposals, there are no prioritized funding opportunities for safety 
schemes. Moreover, we found clauses in the PMR (Figure D) discouraging the SPV from seeking 
funding from the HA for improvement schemes. For example, one of the PMR’s scoring criteria 
requires the SPV to propose solutions and plans “often without calling on additional funding from 
the HA”; while another PMR performance parameter emphasizes that the SPV should “understand 
and work within the HA’s budget constraints”. It is unlikely that the SPV will self-funding such 
schemes as the only (directly-related) financial incentive available for safety outcomes is the SPA, 
which lacks proper incentivization given its calculation has resulted in deductions and the bonus is 
capped at £1 million: 
 
There aren’t any quick fixes really on safety performance, it is a long-term trend that you are 
trying to influence. Now there are issues with the precise way the safety performance 
measurement is calculated. (CM-HA) 
 
This is further evidenced by government’s risk-management perspective: 
 
The influences on these performance elements [safety] is much wider and that is why their 
payment incentives are capped because there will be a high-risk premium if we didn’t cap 
them. (CM-HA) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the private sector has a different perspective on capping the SPA. While for 
government it is a risk-management strategy, particularly where it is perceived that the underlying 
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risk cannot be fully influenced by the contractors, the SPV considered it a trade-off against their 
incentivization for addressing long-term strategic (safety) objectives:  
 
Particularly in case of Safety Action Plans, there is no financial incentive…. The plan has been 
produced each year by the sub-contractors, but I think the money is so small I wouldn’t be 
able to say whether they [the HA] have got their value for money through that. (CEO-SPV) 
 
Further, our analysis of the PMR framework as articulated in Schedule 18 and other relevant 
schedules reveals that it is a tool (scorecard) that attempts to quantify and make calculable UK 
government’s rationalities for engaging with the private sector (SPV in our case) as a better 
provider of public services. The PMR assigns broad competence-based attributes to the SPV 
articulated as four broad performance areas, with each performance area supported by a set of 
performance measures based on a Likert-type rating (scoring) scale (see Section 5.2). However, 
despite being a multi-dimensional performance measurement tool, we find, consistent with our 
knowledge analytic discussion (see Section 5.2), conflicting weights (ranks) assigned to different 
stakeholders. While some PMR performance measures score the SPV on the basis of its 
engagement with road users and other stakeholders and responding to their needs, greater emphasis 
and hence scoring is placed upon aligning the SPV’s functions to the HA’s goals. Thus, the HA 
assumes the identity of an agent for road users and other stakeholders: 
 
Schedule 18 […] requires the Operator to assist DBFO-Co to achieve the Secretary of State’s 
objectives … through continuous improvement and the generation of realistic and 
implementable ideas, proposals and schemes.… If DBFO-Co is successful in meeting its 
obligations under the DBFO Contract and not otherwise performing badly under the Contract, 
a bonus payment will be payable by the Secretary of State to DBFO-Co. (Schedule 25) 
 
As discussed under fields of visibility (see Section 5.1), the SPV is obligated under the contract to 
deliver continuous improvement by developing and initiating improvement schemes for the key 
project objectives in Alpha, including safety. Two of the PMR’s performance attributes, ‘proposing 
solutions’ and ‘demonstrating added value’ (see Section 5.2), place emphasis on the SPV to work 
continuously towards this end; albeit, the highest scores against these performance areas demand 
the SPV to self-fund such schemes. 
Consistent with Chang (2009) and Speklé and Verbeeten (2014), the conflicting weights and 
subjectivity embedded in performance measurement systems decouple them from their underlying 
strategic management objectives: 
 
I don’t think we have got a mechanism that properly focuses on the most important issues. It 
is very driven by how an obligation is defined, how significant a performance-point risk is, not 
how important that obligation is. And then some of the detail things… mixes the cause and 
effect, which isn’t really very helpful. It should have been clearer as to whether we are more 
worried about the cause or are worried about the potential effect. (CM-HA) 
 
Similar perceptions prevailed about the PMR within the SPV: 
 
Once a year we score against this matrix. If you look at it, it could become a vehicle for 
measuring excellence. However, if you look at the description under each of these boxes, they 
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are quite subjective in their own right…. So there is a lot of interpretation that needs to be put 
into this. (CEO-SPV) 
 
However, while stringent controls may be necessary to reduce the risk of excessive SPV profits, 
PFI’s contractual nature should not necessarily inhibit relationship development (e.g. if there is 
some leeway with penalties or the contractor receives a contribution towards introducing safety 
initiatives) (Reeves, 2008) and trust-based relationships with formal and informal structures can 
enhance stakeholder relationships (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011). 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper analyzes the accounting-based MCS regimes in a UK PFI-road project as the means for 
government to operationalize commuters’ safety-related objectives in the project road. It explores 
how accounting becomes implicated in complex neoliberal organizations as regimes of governing 
practices rather than critiquing UK government’s PFI or transport sector policy objectives. To 
address this, we examined road-users’ safety-related KPIs and the underlying control regimes in 
Alpha. 
This research provides significant theoretically-informed insights about how government uses 
accounting to control public service delivery that is outsourced to private contractors, within 
complex organizational PPP/PFI arrangements. Specifically, we combine governmentality theory 
and Dean’s (2009) analytics of government to explore how UK governments control transport 
policies through PFIs. Whilst Spence and Rinaldi (2014) also apply Dean’s framework, they 
examine the introduction of sustainability accounting in a supply chain organisation, focusing on 
how senior managers frame and use sustainability accounting for disciplinary purposes albeit 
supposedly to further social and environmental goals. In contrast, based upon an analysis of UK 
government PFI policy and case study-specific documents, together with interviews and 
observations, we consider how control mechanisms and their performance measures work in a PPP 
context where there is significant contractual misalignment on how to improve road safety and 
accidents. Thus, whereas Spence and Rinaldi (and Frame and Bebbington (2012)) concentrate upon 
traditional top-down governmentality regimes, in Alpha regimes of practices are deployed to shape 
the decision and actions of organizations as ‘collectives’ (Boomsma and O’Dwyer, 2019). This 
allowed us to reveal that partners’ different operating logics can have a constitutive impact on 
governmentality. 
Our primary interest for investigating the control regimes in Alpha was to understand their effect 
as technologies of government on the service-providing organization (i.e. the SPV). From 
governmentality and management accounting research viewpoints, this study is important as it 
furthers our understanding of how: controlling accounting regimes are utilized as technologies of 
government by governing authorities to formulate and implement strategic goals (Frame and 
Bebbington, 2012; Narayan and Stittle, 2018); and the regimes constitute the local actors as self-
governing subjects (Dean, 2010), with the implications for achieving (neoliberal) government 
objectives. Moreover, from an accounting perspective, it makes an important contribution as the 
limited prior research on the management of operational PFI contracts does not provide a general 
theoretical framework that addresses the controversial accounting tools/concepts raised in PFI 
contracts (Shaoul et al., 2007; Andon, 2012; Ahmad et al., 2018).
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Figure E Governmentality of road-users’ safety in Alpha 
 
Governing ‘safety’ 
in Alpha  
Knowledge 
 Accounting numbers are language for elaborate 
IT-based information flows. 
 Information systems provided panoptical 
mechanisms for the HA 
 Performance measurement was bureaucratic  
 Quantification of qualitative performance 
areas, such as safety, was not reliable and 
contested.  
Field of visibility 
 Project objectives were largely a translation of 
HA’s aim and corporate goals. 
 Focus of the road-users’ safety measures is KSI 
accidents. 
 Government or private sector funding for safety 
improvement schemes was not a priority. 
Techniques and practices 
 Elaborate and stringent financial and non-
financial incentive regimes. 
 Incentives are less effective and less 
incentivizing for funding long-run strategic 
outcomes. 
 Effectiveness of the incentives is compromised 
by risk transfer perceptions of government. 
Identities 
 SPV having to engage with public and other 
stakeholders 
 Government (i.e. HA) is self-identified as agent 
of the public 
 Differing perspectives about what makes an 
intervention ‘safe’ 
 Public and private sectors are working on 
contractual (arms-length) terms instead of 
partnering terms. 
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In this regard, the analytics of governmentality presented in Figure E, which enables the 
problematization and exploration of the MCS deployed in Alpha, raises doubts about the linkages 
between political intent and localized practices. At the macro-level (UK government policy 
discourse), road-users’ safety appears paramount. However, we find in Alpha that safety, as a long-
term objective, is not supported by the deployed MCS, with the economic priority for improving 
road-users’ safety diminishing at the project level. Alpha’s project objectives and their KPIs are 
shaped by the HA’s corporate goals, with the funding of safety-related schemes proposed by the 
contractors not being prioritized by either party. For Alpha, the governance focus on road-users’ 
safety remains improving the trend and numbers of KSIs, which are measured by elaborate and IT-
supported information flows, with self-reporting by the SPV being a key feature. However, the 
knowledge analytic (see Section 5.2) reveals that how the accounting numbers are used to manage 
performance in Alpha is contested, leading to calls for elements of the MCS, such as the SPA, to 
be revised. Moreover, as the numbers are employed in a diagnostic manner for performance 
monitoring, this constrains opportunities for positive feedback for the contractors and potentially 
hinders incentives and opportunities for private sector innovation. Similar constraining effects of 
the MCS were found under the identities analytic (see Section 5.3), with the HA (public sector) 
and the SPV (private sector) appearing not to be working on a relational basis. Instead, although 
the SPV is responsible for accomplishing Alpha’s road-users’ safety objectives, it is subjugated to 
the HA, which is established in the contract as the most powerful and influential stakeholder and 
as a self-identified agent for the public. Likewise, our techniques and practices analytic (see 
Section 5.4) reveals that Alpha’s incentive regimes do not incentivize the SPV to initiate long-run 
safety-related improvement schemes. In particular, the SPA is complex and produces unintended 
deductions. This supports an important, albeit overlooked, aspect of governmentality that, once 
rendered calculable, it is difficult for organizations to install monitoring, reporting and recording 
systems that are consistent and cumulative over time (McKinlay et al., 2010), with the political 
rationalities and supporting regimes of practices potentially causing unintended consequences 
(Diefenbach, 2009; Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014). 
An emerging argument is that, although PFI in the UK has been politically supported and 
sustained by successive governments under the banner of public private ‘partnerships’, Alpha’s 
MCS are not facilitating real partnership working between the HA and the SPV. Thus, as Hodge 
and Greve (2018) posit, whilst tight governance is needed to protect the public interest, weaker 
(partnering/relational) governance is also required to enable risk-taking and innovation. Our 
findings suggest government agencies and private sector managers have a different perspective as 
to how accounting information should contribute to performance measures, with the former 
viewing accounting information primarily for bureaucratic control purposes for implementing 
government policies. This has important policy and practice implications given the evidence that 
poor communication and collaboration during the operational stages has contributed to the failure 
of certain UK government outsourcing contracts (NAO, 2009; Demirag, 2018). Whilst 
acknowledging the need for control, especially during contract procurement and early 
implementation phases, as a contract evolves during implementation and trust is developed (e.g. if 
performance targets are met or the SPV proposes innovative solutions to problems), a shift away 
from formal control to more flexible informal control may be beneficial (Burke and Demirag, 2017; 
Abdullah and Khadaroo, 2020). 
Furthermore, our findings imply a detachment between the underlying political rhetoric and 
its operationalisation (Maran et al., 2016), with the HA promoting safety-related objectives 
externally whilst simultaneously working within its own budgetary objectives and (largely) 
requiring the SPV to fund safety-related improvements. Whilst it is understandable that our SPV 
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interviewees would contend that more autonomy and greater financial incentives from the HA 
would enhance performance, the HA’s stance is equally comprehensible given recent PFI failures. 
Notwithstanding this, in our opinion, how MCS are designed and deployed is fundamental to the 
achievement (or failure) of PFIs and other such models as research indicates that projects involving 
flexible and collaborative MCS are better at managing risks and uncertainties (Barretta et al., 2008; 
English and Baxter, 2010; Chung, 2016). Thus, a key policy consideration emerging from this 
study is that governmentality in complex networks such as PFIs is an evolving phenomenon as 
each partnering organisation has to deal with individuals and organisations outside their sovereign 
realm. The lessons from failures like Carillion and London Underground can inform the 
governmentality of future complex network organisations of public service delivery. 
Based upon our analysis of the SPV’s practices, deviation from the incentivized standards and 
variations in the partners’ perceptions did not stem from resistance to the controls or in pursuance 
of opportunistic behavior. Instead, on several occasions during the fieldwork, the contractors 
appeared motivated to be the best performers in the industry. Thus, the tension about how 
accounting (i.e. MCS in Alpha) is used for managing the SPV’s performance signal the presence 
of differing operating logics (Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019). For the contractors, their logics appear 
powerful in guiding their cognition and decision-making. These contentions and practices of re-
negotiations in complex PFI-type networks could be evidence of the struggle by the contractors to 
gain support for their logics and hence infuse their (version of) practices (Lounsbury, 2008). 
Although, there is emerging evidence of re-negotiation and extra-contractual collaborations for 
managing complex operational stages (Chung, 2016; Ahmad et al., 2018). We therefore suggest 
that another lens be added to Dean’s (2010) analytics of government, that is, the ‘extra-contractual 
regimes of practices’ which could focus on why and how localized inter-party collaboration and 
negotiations in PFI or other complex networks emerge in response to contentions arising from MCS 
elements. For example, it would be interesting to follow how Alpha’s SPA is reviewed and revised.  
This paper also provides insights about risk transfer and management issues in operational (road) 
PFIs. While previous accounting research on how risk in operational UK PFI contracts is 
transferred and managed has focused on private sector perceptions and practices (Demirag et al., 
2011, 2012), this study draws on public and private sector perceptions about these issues. We find 
that capping financial incentives is influenced by the public sector’s perception of ‘optimal’ risk 
transfer, which might be different to the private partners’ perceptions. Moreover, we find that 
capping financial incentives (i.e. bonus payments) could compromise the incentives’ effectiveness. 
However, since we could not perform a financial analysis of these issues, future research could 
investigate why and how the amounts and caps for performance-based incentives are determined, 
and their adequacy as effective incentive regimes, given the criticism that PFI contracting 
companies already earn substantial profits (Hellowell and Vecchi, 2012). 
We acknowledge that by analyzing a single road case study PFI contract the findings may not 
be generalizable. However, this paper provides constructive and new nuanced understandings 
about control and governance of a public service supply chain partner in the context of PFI. 
Previous accounting research on supply chain controls and management has focused on the private 
sector (Spence and Rinaldi, 2014). We encourage accounting scholars to explore the roles of 
accounting as technologies of government within different structural and contextual arrangements 
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